Grooming a setup man to close keeps him way cheaper before your closer ends up leaving seems to be the most likely reason to me. The thought being that those types of guys will step up eventually when the fellow moves on.

Also, don’t know that BJ Ryan is the best example, since Accardo did a pretty damned good job in his absence, and the Jays had multiple people with closing experience. They just had an established pecking order with Ryan at the end.

Not that it would be a bad idea. I can definitely see it being a good idea for some teams.

the question shouldn’t be why don’t teams use R/L closer committees, but why do teams use closers at all? Why would anyone hold back their best relief pitcher for a game situation that may not (in fact is usually not) the riskiest situation for the team. Because the definition of save is so broad, and managers stick to relief roles, closers often come into games with no one on base and a 2 or 3 run lead. Most relievers will succeed in that role over 90% of the time. Teams like Cleveland, San Diego, Tampa, and Arizona (whether intentionally or not) made better use of their bullpens by having their best relievers as set up guys that they could insert into games in high leverage situations.

The problem is that reliever usage is often dictated by a stat (saves) that has little to no relation to the value of the relief situation.

when they somehow managed to have Huston Street face 4 straight lefties, then Jerry Blevins face something like 3 out of 4 righties.

Keep in mind both of those guys allow something like a .500 OPS to guys of their handedness and about a .750 to the other side.

The problem with the Co-Closer theory is that there are humans involved…..

1) Money. More and more pitchers are getting paid for racking up “Saves”, thus if you are a relief pitcher/prospect who is looking to get paid, you want to be a full closer and will not be happy unless you are in that role.

And before you suggest that if you pay them closer money, they shouldn’t care what role they are used in, Realize that we’re also talking about future contracts….a couple years out of an full closers role and people will have doubts about if he can still handle it, taking money out of their next contract. Realize that we are also talking about endorsements, which the pitcher might not recieve being in a “Co-Closer” system. Even if the money is the same up front, it doesn’t necessairily mean the future money is close to the same.

2) Prestige. The 9th inning, like it or not, is viewed as the most important inning, people remember who celebrated the big outs that clinch championships, as a Mets fan I remember Jesse Orosco throwing his glove in the air after saving the final game of the 86 series. I’m sure Phillies fans will remember Brad Lidge out there with his teammates last October. Those are the moments that all closers aspire to be a part of…….and unfortunately, not enough people remember who induced the double play in the 7th inning that made the 9th inning celebration possible.

3) The action of making it happen is far more complicated then you would think. Lets face it, the top rate “Closers” are not interested in being a part of a “Co-Closer” role, they believe they can handle the role by themselves. Hell, the middle tier of “Closers” are not interested in a “Co-Closer” role either. Thus, you would be forced to settle for second rate pitchers, or developing your own pitchers, ones that would be happy just being given the opportunity to close some games, when building such a bullpen. Of course, when you are settling for second rate pitchers from the beginning you cannot possibly expect to see elite results, that’s why several previous “Closer by Committee” systems have failed. And of course, once they become established in their “Co-Closer” roles they’ll likely seek greener pastures ($$$), so there will be a high turnover rate there even if it does show some reason to think it might be successful.

It sounds better on paper then it actually plays out in reality.

I think the closer concept is off base (no pun). Right now, the closer is used in the ninth inning of every game in which the lead is three runs or fewer. Why?

Where can a closer help more — pitching the final two innings in a one-run game or pitching a single inning in a two-run game and another in a three-run game? I think the answer is rather obvious.

Sometimes the key situation of a game doesn’t even come in a set up or closing situation. It can come in the fifth, sixth or seventh inning, that inning when the bases somehow get loaded in a one- or two-run game. Why not bring the closer in then?

Or to follow through on this particular thread, if a lefty is needed, why not bring in your best lefty if the closer is right-handed and might be more useful later? Or vice versa. Why not do situational managing?

I guess my question is, would it be too much to ask for a manager and pitching coach to figure out which pitcher is best for a given situation, rather than doing everything by rote?

How about taking a different kind of role approach — one where every pitcher knows he will get regular work and knows his specific role? One with takes advantages of different pitching styles and coreographs lefties with righties?

Why not take our team’s five starters and match them up with five “finishers.” The starters would be coupled with the “finishers” by handedness and by style. If the starter were a flame-throwing right-hander, he would be matched with a “finisher” who was a southpaw, a soft tosser, or — better yet — both.

The starter would pitch as long as the game situation dictated — including completing the game on rare occasions. But when it was time to pinch hit or to bring in a reliever, the “finisher” would be called. That pitcher would then finish the game as long as the situation so dictated. If not, he would turn the game over to one of the closers — preferably one left-handed and one right-handed, to better provide for situational use.

The idea would be to turn the lineup around with the “finisher,” so that if trouble arose late in the game, the closer of opposite hand could be called in for a highly critical situation.

It is even possible this methodology could be used with just four starters and four “finishers,” since there would be less pressure on the starter to pitch deeply into the game. Then with two or three closers, a pitching staff of “just” 10 or 11 pitches could be used, actually giving a team a real bench.

Oh, and while there would be teamwork and a set role between and for the closer and his “finisher,” there would also be a healthy competition. If a starter were failing in his duties as a starter, the “finisher” could take his spot in the rotation, with the former starter becoming the new “finisher.”

Don’t know how practical either of these two ideas are, but at least they would offer something besides the status quo.

Clearly the first approach would work best with two or three good relievers who could flourish in tough situations, regardless of inning. The second approach would work best with a plethora of pitchers who could pitch starter or at least long relief innings and who had some complementary features. And with two solid relievers for closers, one of each hand.

But the beauty of such an approach is that most pitchers are starters until they have to be converted. Using five starters and five “finishers” takes advantage of the pitchers’ natural ability to pitch fairly long innings. Each of the ten long-ining pitchers could gear up for their particular day to pitch. There would be no need to overwork a starter, since his “finisher” would stand at the ready.

An opposing manager who liked to turn his lineup around to take advantage of matchups would find his hands a bit more tied, perhaps to the point of frustration. And our team’s manager would be in fine position to set up and take advantage of matchups nearly all game long. With a “finisher” at the ready, pinch hitting for the starter could be done more strategically.

Good grief! If a team is going to have 12 or 13 pitchers, why not take advantage of ALL of them? Couldn’t hurt with building the team concept, and might even help keep arms fresher. And wouldn’t it be REALLY amazing if the concept could be done with 10 or 11 pitchers? Then there would actually be players available to pinch hit when needed.

Another option that I recall Tony Larussa tried a few years back and which I think had a lot of merit was the four man rotation. I’m not talking about going back to the days of Cy Young or even of Tom Seaver, 70-80 pitches per start should keep most starters fresh enough to come back on three days rest and not infrequently a fourth day or rest would show up due to an off day. You could then have a couple of guys including the guy who would otherwise be your fifth starter coming in and pitching a couple of innnings (ideally a lefty folowing a right or vica versa) in games that are going well and a couple of other guys who would come in if the game wasn’t going so well. That should get you to the 7th and from there you could go with traditional roles or mix that up as well.

My recollection is that Mcdowell/Orosco worked quite well for the Mets, in the mid-80s, but of course there has been a redefinition of the closer role since then specifically since Eckersley. Bill James and others have written extensively on the point that the highest leverage situations aren’t always the begin the 9th inning save. If Mariano Rivera is so good isn’t he the one who should come in with the bases loaded up a couple of runs with one out in the 8th, get out of that mess and then let the next best guy finish? The problem is that the players agent would be complaining that he was not being used appropriately and the media has the idea of setup man and closer so fixed in their brains that you would never be able to convince them that Mo hadn’t been demoted. I think if a team were foftuitous enough to get a lefty and a right simultaneously who are both very good and neither of which has been closing already that you might be able to try this out, but it would take a very strong manager and gm to avoid having this lumped as another case of closer by committee.